Human social dilemmas are often shaped by actions involving uncertain goals and returns that may only be achieved in the future. Climate action, voluntary vaccination and other prospective choices stand as paramount examples of this setting [1][2][3][4] . In this context, as well as in many other social dilemmas, uncertainty may produce non-trivial effects 5 . Whereas uncertainty about collective targets and their impact were shown to negatively affect group coordination and success [6] [7] [8] , no information is available about timing uncertainty, i.e. how uncertainty about when the target needs to be reached affects the outcome as well as the decision-making. Here we show experimentally -through a collective dilemma wherein groups of participants need to avoid a tipping point under the risk of collective loss 8 -that timing uncertainty prompts not only early generosity 9 but also polarized contributions, in which participants' total contributions are distributed more unfairly than when there is no uncertainty. Analyzing participant behavior reveals, under uncertainty, an increase in reciprocal strategies wherein contributions are conditional on the previous donations of the other participants, a group analogue of the well-known Tit-for-Tat 10,11 strategy. Although large timing uncertainty appears to reduce collective success, groups that successfully collect the required amount show strong reciprocal coordination. This conclusion is supported by a game theoretic model examining the dominance of behaviors in case of timing uncertainty. In general, timing uncertainty casts a shadow on the future 11 that leads participants to respond early, encouraging reciprocal behaviors, and unequal contributions.
Introduction
Public good games (PGG) provide abstractions of many real-world problems wherein personal and shortterm interests of multiple players are in conflict with societal, long-term interests 12 . Participants in such games can contribute voluntarily to a common good, which can, once established, be accessed without restrictions by all, thus even those that did not contribute. Rational selfish behavior stipulates that it is best to not contribute; yet such decision would be detrimental as a group is better off when all contribute.
These games not only serve as a good model for many for social public benefits (e.g., social security, retirement funds), but are also recurrent in many other collective endeavors, from group hunting 13, 14 to public health 3, [15] [16] [17] [18] and sociopolitical processes like climate change 1, 6, [19] [20] [21] [22] .
We place our experimental within the collective risk dilemma (CRD) 8 , a variant of a PGG, where a threshold makes the outcome of the game non-linear, and the collective benefit uncertain and only achievable in the future [23] [24] [25] . This model has been adopted to address the complexity pertaining decisionmaking under climate dilemmas 8, 9, 21, 26 , but its significance is general enough to be of interest to a broad range of Human endeavors, such as costly signaling, voting or petitioning. At the start of the game, participants are each given an endowment ( ), and they must decide whether to contribute, up to a predefined amount, to the common good over a fixed number of rounds. If the joint contributions of all the participants over those rounds are equal or above a certain threshold, then the disaster is averted, and they receive as a reward the remainder of the endowment (hence the dilemma). On the contrary, if the target is not reached, there is a probability that a disaster may occur, resulting in economical loss for all the participants (they lose the remainder of their endowment). This is modelled by a risk parameter and both experiments and theoretical analysis show that people only tend to contribute to avoid the disaster if they perceive the risk to be high 8, [20] [21] [22] [26] [27] [28] [29] . Moreover, even when the risk is high, theoretical models indicate that players tend to delay their contributions when the moment of disaster is known 21, 30 .
Both threshold PGG and CRD make strong assumptions about what is known in the game: Each participant knows from the start how much they need to acquire collectively to reach the target and how much time they have to achieve this. Yet in real-world scenario's the amount as well as the timing when it has to be achieved may not be certain, as they are based on predictions and thus inherently suffer from uncertainties. Prior work on uncertainty about what amount (threshold) should be achieved in PGG 5, 31 and CRD 6, 7 has shown that the level of cooperation, i.e. the willingness to contribute in both games, is negatively affected, yet no insights exist on how timing uncertainty affects the decision-making process.
To answer this question, three experimental treatments are performed here. First, as a control treatment (NU -no uncertainty), we investigated the behavior of groups of 6 participants, wherein each can contribute 0, 2 or 4 EMUs (Experimental Monetary Units) at each of the 10 rounds of the experiment ( ! = 10). When the group does not reach the target contribution of 120 EMUs by the 10 th round, they risk losing the remainder of their initial endowment (40 EMUs) with a 90% probability. NU, thus, repeats the work of Milinski et al. 8 , but without the climate change framing, which avoids possible cultural effects due to climate awareness, while enabling the generalization of our conclusions to other problems captured by the CRD. Conversely, in the second treatment (LU -low uncertainty), participants did not know exactly when the experiment would finish. They were told the experiment lasts on average 10 rounds and that from round ! = 8 there was a possibility that the game ends (see Supporting Information (SI) for instructions): a 6 faces dice was thrown, and the game would continue if the result was higher than 2 (i.e., the game ends with a probability of = 1 [(10 − ! ) + 1] ⁄ = 1/3 ). If the game continues, the same process is repeated at the end of each round, until the dice result indicated the end of the experiment. The game can thus stop early at round 8 but also continue multiple rounds after round 10. Finally, for the third treatment (HU -high uncertainty) we increased the uncertainty, i.e., the variance of the distribution of final rounds, by making ! = 6 (and = 1/5 -we throw a 10 faces dice in this case). Importantly, we made sure that all participants are clearly informed, in every treatment, that the average number of rounds is 10 (their understanding was tested before starting the experiment). Note that in all three treatments, fair behavior would be to contribute in total half of one's endowment (F=E/2), as it would ensure that everyone has the same, maximized gains and that the target is met. For NU (black lines and triangles), the groups invested per round on average the minimum amount required to reach the target by the end of the game (12 EMUs per round). Treatments LU (red lines and stars) and HU (yellow lines and circles) assume low and high timing uncertainty, respectively, even though the game would on average end at 10 rounds. Our results suggest that the higher the uncertainty on the timing of the final round, higher the amount contributed at early stages of the game. As a result, when groups succeed in reaching the collective threshold, they do so in a smaller number of rounds (see Panel (c)). However, these early investments did not lead, on average, to higher collective success. Instead, in panel (b), we can see that the group achievement of HU is lower than NU and LU.
Results

a b c
In the absence of any timing uncertainty (NU, black lines and bars in Figure 1 ), the experimental results
show that groups can reach the target amount, and that their investments per round follow closely the minimum required to reach the target by the end of the 10 th round (Figure 1a ). Figure 1b shows that more than 65% of the groups were successful (average group achievement, ). These groups nonetheless reached the targeted amount only by the last round ( Figure 1c ), and those that did not, were always very close to it, indicating a failure in the final coordination. On the contrary, whenever timing uncertainty is present (LU and HU), individuals tend to contribute earlier in the game, with the amount contributed per round increasing with the uncertainty on the game timeframe (see Figure 1a ). Figure S1 in SI, provides similar conclusions when examining the average donations per round and per group.
The motivation behind each individual's decision to contribute early is certainly diverse. In LU, the investments are very close to the required donation per round for a game with only 8 rounds. Indeed, as shown in Figure 1c , groups that met the target in LU, did this by round 8 on average, while the fraction of groups that met the target did not change significantly (Figure 1b , see Methods for statistical test).
This indicates that participants attempted to reduce the uncertainty of the game (and the risk associated) by investing earlier. Yet, in HU, the average investments were lower than those required to reach the target in 6 rounds (see Figure 1a ). In this third treatment, groups only managed to reach the target on average by round 8 (see Figure 1c ), which indicates that uncertainty affects behavior (see also Figure S2 in SI) in a way that is subtler than simply understanding LU and HU treatments as if players would be playing a distinct game with less rounds. In other words, under timing uncertainty, individuals behave, on average, in a risk-averse fashion, reacting earlier to the collective dilemma, and finding it unlikely that the game would end after the average number of rounds (10, in this case).
Independent of when they try to reach the target, if every participant invests half of his or her E then the target is reached, and they all go home with the same gains. This fair share F can be achieved by accumulating different combinations of 0, 2 or 4 EMUs over the different rounds. Indeed, we observe in the investments per round for the NU experiment that most participants giving F do not do this by giving 2 in every round. Only 15% (11 out of 72) of all participants giving F and 20% (10 out of 48) of the successful ones do this by always giving what could be the locally fair share. Fairness in this game is thus defined at the game-level and not the round-level. Now, when considering, within each group, the cumulated investments over all rounds (C), one can observe that individuals react to uncertainty by either giving more or less than from F (see Figure 2a ),.
This suggests that the presence of timing uncertainty not only leads to earlier investments, as mentioned earlier, but also promotes the emergence of polarized reactions and unequal contributions among participants, with more players' C deviating from F than when there is no uncertainty. This observation is confirmed in HU (see Figure 2a ), where the prevalence of unfair contributions increases further when compared with NU and LU. This polarized pattern may suggest a co-existence of risk-averse and riskseeking individuals 32, 33 , depending on whether individuals base their choices on a number of rounds below or above the average of 10 rounds.
The same cumulative data also reveals the shift towards early investments when considering players' donations in the beginning and end of the game (see Figure 2b ). Our results show how participants distribute their donations over time, by dividing the game into two halves (from [1, ! /2] and ( ! /2, ], i.e., half means 5, 4 and 3 for NU, LU and HU respectively). The fraction of players whose C is more, equal or less than half of the fair donation, i.e., /2, is shown for the groups that reached the target. In the treatments with uncertainty (LU and HU), the fraction of > /2 players in the 1 st half is significantly higher than that of the 2 nd half, which means that participants invest earlier to reach the target. In contrast, in NU there is a slight increase in > /2 during the second half of the game. This may be related to players trying to compensate for procrastination, resulting in higher investments at the end. Moreover, when comparing the donations between players that met and did not meet the target (see Figure S3 in SI), the difference between the fraction of players that invest > /2 in the 1 st half of the game grows with uncertainty. This highlights the importance of investing earlier and not procrastinating under the presence of timing uncertainty.
Figure 2. Distribution of participant behavior and dependence on time.
Fraction of players within successful groups that invest less, equal or more than the fair donation (if all participants of a group invest exactly , they reach the target) (a) and how these behaviors are distributed over the first and second halves (1 half means 5, 4, and 3 rounds for NU, LU and HU respectively) of the game (b). Panel a shows that as uncertainty increases, more players invest either more or less than , while the players that invest exactly decrease. Panel b shows how this behavior is spread across the game, by showing the fraction of players that invest less, equal or more than / in each half of the game. The plot shows that the investments in the first half of the game increase with uncertainty, in comparison to NU.
Not only do participants tend to invest earlier in the presence of timing uncertainty, but their donations become dependent on what the group members did (see Figure 3 ), to the point that the predominant behavior in successful LU and HU resembles a group-level reciprocal behavior 34 or Tit-for-Tat (TfT) 10, 35 .
Such group reciprocal behavior, or group conditional cooperation, has also been observed in linear public good games without a threshold 36,37 , and it has been identified experimentally as a beneficial strategy for climate action 38 . Although this behavior does not avoid free-riding (there is actually and increase as can be seen in Figure   2a ), it promotes generosity among the participants and appears necessary for a successful outcome. In Figure 3 , we can see that there is a positive correlation between the group donations and the average donation of the players in LU and HU (see correlations in Table S1 in SI) for the players that met the target. In contrast, the players that did not meet the target do not display the same conditional behavior or even to the same extent, indicating that reciprocity is used here by the participants to achieve "honest" coordination in the presence of timing uncertainty.
Figure 3. Prevalence of group reciprocity for different uncertainty levels.
We show the average donation per player in function of the donations of the group members in the previous round (without the focal player). The plots are separated by treatment (columns) and by whether they met (True) or not (False) the target (rows). We fitted a weighted linear regression on each plot (see Methods). This analysis shows that there is no significant dependency on the group donations for NU, despite a slightly negative correlation factor for the players that reached the target, which indicates a compensatory behavior. However, there is a significant dependency on the group donations under uncertainty (LU and HU). Moreover, for LU, the groups that did not reach the target display a slight compensatory behavior, in contrast to the reciprocal behavior of those that did. Inside each plot, we show a subplot of the frequency of each action (0, 2 and 4) for the different group donations. These plots depict clearly how, for LU and HU, the frequency of action 4 increases with the group donation on the previous round, while action 0 increases when the previous donations were low. In comparison, action 2 is predominant when there is no uncertainty or when groups did not achieve the goal (LU-HU).
The non-trivial dynamics and behavioral ecology of switching from compensating to reciprocal behavior may be explained by a game theoretical model, that describes the behavioral dynamics through an evolutionary process (see Methods for a full description). Given the strategy profiles identified in Figure   3 , human subjects mostly adhere to either unconditional investments or conditional strategies based on the level of investments in the previous round. For simplicity, we define here three unconditional heuristics or strategies, i.e. always-2 (gives 2 in every round), always-4 (invest gives 4 in each round), always-0 (invest nothing throughout the game), and the two conditional ones, i.e. compensator (will invest 4 when the group members did not invest) and reciprocal (will invest 4 as long as the group Target not met members invest). All strategies will stop contributing once the collective target is achieved. We consider a population of individuals who may adopt one of these five strategies and revise their choices based on the relative success of each strategy 39 (see Methods for details). More advanced strategies could be considered, yet even with this baseline model, our experimental observations can be explained. Indeed, the model confirms that, under uncertainty, the reciprocal strategy prevails among those strategies that contribute to the collective good (see Figure 4a ), while capturing also that the group achievement does not change significantly with uncertainty. Moreover, the model indicates that the always-2 strategy is only stable when there is no timing uncertainty (see Figure S6 in SI). The presence of this type of uncertainty induces the population into cyclic dynamics, where the dominance of direct reciprocity increases with uncertainty. The model is also able to capture the inequality in contributions and the increase in polarization observed in the experiments (see Figure 4b ). , see Methods for a detailed explanation of the parameters).
Discussion
Despite the simplicity of our experimental setup and associated theoretical model, the trends identified may hold potential lessons for dealing with uncertainty in local and global governance. Our results show that contrary to the outcome for other types of uncertainty, timing uncertainty promotes early investments by the participants. Moreover, timing uncertainty appears to increase polarized reactions among the participants, suggesting a co-existence of risk-prone and risk-averse preferences, while diminishing the a b Group achievement Proportion of reciprocals number of players contributing a fair share and increasing those that give less or more. Interestingly, our result relates nicely with recent findings in the context of behavioral dynamics in urban settings. It has been shown that uncertainty associated with big cities intensified both risk-seeking and risk-taking reactions, while the predictability of small villages encouraged more homogeneous and intermediate choices 40 . Such heterogeneity highlights the intricacy of the study of the emergence of polarized preferences beyond contagious processes 41 , with potential implications in various socio-political and ecological contexts.
At the same time, conditional behaviors emerge in the presence of timing uncertainty, and groups that were able to coordinate through reciprocal behavior were more successful than those that simply played a fixed strategy or compensated for those giving not enough. This heavily contrasts with the predominant behavior when the length of the game is certain, in which most players unconditionally opt for a fair share F. Our results suggest that, when the future is uncertain and stakeholders are aware of it, they tend to respond early, encouraging others to reach the target together. This effect may be potentially maximized when combined with communication, institutions or costly commitments 20, [42] [43] [44] [45] . 
Data availability.
The datasets generated and analyzed during the current study are available from the corresponding author on reasonable request.
Code availability
The code of the experimental framework developed to perform the experiments is available at https://github.com/Socrats/beelbe.
Methods
Experiments. The results of our experiment were obtained by testing 246 participants (41% females) that were divided into 41 groups of six subjects each in a computerized experiment (using the software available at https://github.com/Socrats/beelbe). Ethical approval was obtained from the Ethical Commission for Human Sciences at the Vrije Universiteit Brussel to perform this experiment. Most of the participants were bachelor/master students of either the Université Libre de Bruxelles or the Vrije Universiteit Brussel. The average age of participants was 24 (with a standard deviation of ~4 years).
During each session of the experiments, participants were assigned randomly into groups and were not allowed to communicate (physical barriers were set up between them). Participants never knew who the other members of their group were.
In the control treatment (NU), 12 groups played the collective-risk dilemma (see main text) defined as in 8 with the difference that the game was not framed as a climate change scenario, which makes the results more general to other scenarios of collective-risk where there is an uncertain deadline. Indeed, this type of N-person dilemma, combining non-linear and uncertain returns which are only reached in the future, are recurrent in many human collective endeavors, from public health measures to group hunting. In the treatment with low uncertainty (LU) and high uncertainty (HU), another 14 and 15 groups, respectively, played the variant of the game in which the final round was decided by a random process.
After a minimum number of rounds (8 rounds in LU, and 6 in HU), the probability of the game ending after each round was =1/3 and =1/5 in LU and HU, respectively. To implement this uncertainty in LU (HU) a 6 (10) faces dice was thrown at the end of round 8 (6) , and the game would continue if the result was higher than 2, thus generating the probability for ending the game in LU (HU).
Identifying polarization of donations. We divided the participants on our experiment based on their total donations throughout the game and their relationship to what we call fair donation . This value corresponds to the minimum donation required for a group to be successful, if all participants invest the same, i.e., if all participants invest exactly the group will be successful. This value corresponds to half of the endowment ( = /2). Therefore, we quantify the fraction of participants that contribute, in total, less ( < ), equal ( = ) or more ( > ) than . In Figure 2 , we show that the fraction of participants that invest < and > grows with timing uncertainty, while fair players ( = ) diminish. We associate this divergence of donations to an increase of polarized reactions.
Identifying conditional behavior. Conditional behaviors were assessed through the analysis of the average donation of each player as a function of the donations of the other group members in the previous round (see Figure 3 ). For this reason, the plot starts with the data after the first round. Also, we only take into account the data of the experiment before the target is reached, i.e., when the public account contains less than 120 EMUs. We adopt a weighted linear regression so that samples with smaller errors were more important than those with large ones. The weight of a point is calculated as
where the errors #̅ were computed as :
Here '()"*+, = 4, representing the range of the values an action can take, and | | indicates the number of samples used to calculate the average of the samples vector . This way, points calculated from only 1 sample, almost do not count for the regression.
Statistics. In Figure 1a the averages and error bars (95% confidence interval) are computed across groups (n=12 for NU, n=14 for LU and n=15 for HU). For LU and HU, after the minimum number of rounds, ! , n decreases, since some of the groups finished the game. For LU, = 9 for round 9, = 6 for round 10, = 4 for round 11, = 2 until round 17. For HU, = 12 for round 7, = 7 for round 8, = 4 for round 9, = 2 until round 13, and = 1 until round 19. In Figure 1b each box plot display the proportion of groups that were successful for each of the treatments. 8 out of 12 groups were successful in NU, 9 out of 14 for LU and 7 out of 15 for HU. We performed a Chi-square test of independence ( = 0.49952, = 41, = 2, χ -= 1.38) that issues that the differences between the group achievements among the treatments are not significant. The error bars in Figure 1c represent the 95% confidence interval. This figure shows the average round in which successful groups reached the target (n=8 for NU, n=9 for LU and n=7 for HU). In Figure 2 we calculate the fraction of successful players for each treatment that assume one of 3 contribution behaviors. The total number of players in each of the fractions ( < , = , > ) is (9, 21, 18) for NU, (13, 17, 24) for LU and (13, 8, 21) for HU. The error bars in Figure   3 were calculated as described in the "identifying conditional behavior" section (see SI for detail on the number of samples for the correlation analysis).
Game theoretical model.
As an alternative to considering fully-rational agents, we describe the behavioral dynamics through an evolutionary process 46 , in which individuals tend to copy those appearing to be more successful. We consider a finite population of Z individuals, who interact in groups of size N, in which they engage in the collective-risk dilemma with multiple rounds. Each individual can adopt one of the ns=5 strategies that mimic the behaviors observed on the experimental data: always-2, always-4, always-0, compensator, and reciprocal. The first three strategies are unconditional, i.e., they will always invest the same, independently of the behavior of the other group members. Differently, compensator and reciprocal are conditional strategies that adapt their behavior to the rest of the group according to a threshold of total investments per round. We consider this threshold to be 10, which is exactly half of the maximum investment per round, without the focal player. In this manner, compensators always start investing 2, and, afterwards, invest 0 as long as the sum of contributions of the rest of group members in the previous round is below 10 units; otherwise they will invest 4 EMUs.
The behavior of reciprocal is the exact opposite of compensators: They start by investing 2 EMUs and afterwards they invest 4 EMUs as long the sum of contributions of the other members of the group in the previous rounds is above or equal to 10 units; otherwise they invest 0. We do not assume any population structure, such that individuals are equally likely to interact with each other (the so-called well-mixed assumption). The success (or fitness) of an individual can be computed as the average payoff obtained from playing in multiple groups randomly sampled from the population. As a result, all individuals adopting one of the ns=5 strategies can be seen as equivalent, on average.
To study the behavioral resulting from this set of strategies, we adopt a stochastic birth-death process combined with the pairwise comparison rule 39 to describe the social learning dynamics of each of the strategies in a finite population. At each time-step, a randomly chosen individual has the opportunity to revise their strategy by imitating (or not) the strategy of a randomly selected member of the population B. The imitation will occur with a probability which increases with the fitness difference between and . Here we adopt the Fermi function ≡ b1
where controls the intensity of selection (we use = 0.003), and fA (fB) is the average fitness of ( ). In addition, we consider that, with a mutation probability , individuals adopt a randomly chosen strategy, freely exploring the strategy space.
Overall this adaptive process defines a large-scale Markov process, whose complete characterization becomes unfeasible as one increases the population size and number of strategies 47 . However, this analysis of this stochastic dynamics is largely simplified in the limit of rare mutations. In this case, we are able to compute analytically the relative prevalence of each of the different strategies. Moreover, as
shown in the Supporting Information by means of large-scale computer simulations, this analytical approximation turns out to be valid for much wider interval of mutation regimes. In this limit, when a new strategy appears through mutation, one of two outcomes occurs long before the occurrence of a new mutation: either the population faces the fixation of newly introduced strategy, or the mutant strategy is wiped out from the population. Hence, there will be a maximum of two strategies present simultaneously in the population 48, 49 . This allows one to describe the behavioral dynamics in terms of a reduced Markov Chain of size , = 5, whose transitions are defined by the fixation probabilities "2 of a single mutant with strategy in a population of individuals adopting another strategy . This probability is given by
is the probability to decrease (increase) the number of individuals with the mutant strategy: ± ( ) = 4 :
:%4
:
In the limit of neutral selection ( = 0), the fixation probabilities become independent of the fitness values and equal to 1/Z, offering a convenient reference scenario (see below). Since we will have at most two different strategies in the population, we can calculate the fitness ' of a strategy , in a finite population of size and individuals of strategy and − of strategy , as ' = s :%&
represents a hypergeometric sampling (sampling without replacement) of the population and Π '> ( + 1) is the payoff of strategy when facing strategy , while the group is composed of + 1 individuals with strategy . We numerically estimate pairwise payoffs Π "2 between every strategy pair and , for each possible composition of a group of participants with members of using strategy and − using strategy . This is achieved by averaging over 10 3 games for each composition of the group and treatments (NU, LU and HU, using the same parameters adopted in the lab experiments).
Equipped with these tools, one can now compute the prevalence of each strategy through the stationary , where is a row vector containing the stationary distribution, and Η is a column vector containing the probability of success of each monomorphic state. In our case, the probability of success is always 1 for populations of always-2, reciprocal and always-4 players, while it is 0 for always-0.
Compensators are only successful if the game lasts more than 10 rounds, therefore their probability of success is (1 − ) &!%5 ' , since the random process that decides the final round under timing uncertainty follows a geometric distribution. The calculation of the fraction of players that contribute less, equal or more than , used in Figure 4b , is done in a similar fashion. In this case, we need to calculate the probability that a population consisting of each of the monomorphic states will contribute < , = , > . Since we can calculate the contributions of the players depending on the number of rounds of the game, the computation of these probabilities is straightforward. The always-2 players will always invest , always-4 and reciprocal will contribute > , and always-0 < . Once more, compensators will only contribute > if the number of rounds is bigger than 10, otherwise they contribute < .
We then multiply these probabilities by the stationary distribution to obtain the fraction of players that assume each of the previous behaviors. In Figure 4 all other parameters controlling the environment are set to be the same as in our lab experiments: the risk = 0.9, the initial endowment = 40 and the target is = 120. To obtain further intuition behind the emergence of cooperation, group achievement and strategies in each treatment, we also analyze the typical flow of probability between the different monomorphic states in the presence and absence of uncertainty (see invasion diagrams in Figure S6 ).
Arrows represent transitions favored by natural selection, i.e., those whose fixation probability exceeds 1/Z (associated with the fixation probability of a mutant under neutral evolution). A strategy for which no mutant adopting any other strategy has a selective advantage is said to be an evolutionary robust strategy (ERS) 52 , a convenient measure of strategic stability in this context. As shown in Figure S6 , timing uncertainty changes the set of evolutionary robust strategies, benefiting the flow of probabilities towards the adoption of reciprocal strategies. 
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Nomenclature
For the remainder of this document we will refer to each one of the 3 treatments analyzed in this manuscript in the following way:
• Treatment 1: no uncertainty treatment -NU • Treatment 2: low uncertainty treatment -LU • Treatment 3: high uncertainty treatment -HU
Extended Methods
Experimental procedure
During each session of the experiment, all participants were required to read the instructions on the screen of their assigned computer before the start. The same instructions were provided on a printed copy that they could consult throughout the experiment. After reading, all participants went through a test with the goal to check their understanding. In case of problems the coordinators discussed with them their errors ensuring that everything was clear.
Throughout the experiment each participant observed on his or her screen the amount left in his or her private account and the actions of each of the group members in the previous round. They are thus able to keep track of the behavior of their group mates, but do not know their identity. They could not observe the current state of the public account, yet, they were encouraged to keep track of it by asking them how much they believe is in the account at each round. After the final round (in the treatment with uncertainty they could observe the result of the random value produced by the dice that defined the end of the game), the participants could see on the screen how much was invested in the public account in total and how much was left in their private account, as well as the conversion to euros. In the case this value was below the target, a message would show the result of the dice that decided whether they would lose or not the remaining endowment. Finally, before the participants were allowed to leave the laboratory, they were requested to complete a small survey about their experience during the experiment.
Our experiment models the effect of timing uncertainty on the collective-risk dilemma.
Therefore, there is a stochastic component that we must explain to participants carefully. In order to do this, we used the known example of a virtual dice. For instance, to explain that there is a probability of 1/3 that the game would finish after round 8 in the low uncertainty (LU) treatment, we explain that the computer will "throw a virtual dice of 6 faces, and if the result is either 1 or 2, then the game will end". We also tell participants that, on average, the game takes 10 rounds, to give them an intuition about the distribution of this stochastic process. The details of the instructions for all three treatments can be found in the following sections.
Instructions for the control treatment (no uncertainty -NU)
Each participant had access to the following instructions, both in digital and paper format:
Instructions to the experiment
Welcome to this experiment where you can earn money!
You are about to participate in an experiment on iterative decision-making, conducted by researchers from the Vrije Universiteit Brussel and the Université Libre de Bruxelles. In this experiment, you will earn some money, and the amount will be determined by your choices and the choices of the other participants.
Your privacy is guaranteed: The other participants will not know who you are during the experiment and the results of the experiment are stored in an anonymous manner.
It is very important that you remain silent during the whole experiment, and that you never communicate with other participants, neither verbally, nor in any other way. When in doubt or when you have a question, please just raise your hand and an experimenter will approach you. If you do not remain silent, or if you behave in any way that could potentially disturb the experiment, you will be asked to leave the laboratory, and you will not be paid.
All your earnings during the experiment will be expressed in Experimental Monetary Units (EMUs), which will be transformed into Euros with a change rate of 0.75 Euro to 1 EMU. At the end of the experiment, a show up fee of 2.5 euros will be added to your earnings.
You will be paid privately by bank transfer to your account within a week after the experiment. At the end of the experiment you will be requested to provide your IBAN number and BIC code to make the transfer.
Before starting, you will be randomly assigned into a group. You will never know the identity of the other participants of the group. However, the experiment takes 10 rounds and you will be able to observe the actions of the previous round of every member of your group, starting from round 2.
Login to the experiment Before the experiment can start, please, enter the user login and password you have been given into the login page displayed in the browser of the computer assigned to you.
Once you have logged in, you will be able to see on your screen the same instructions that are written on this paper.
Wait for the instructor's signal before you proceed.
General Information
At the beginning of the experiment you will be randomly assigned to a group, which will include 5 other randomly selected participants.
During the whole experiment, you will interact only with those 5 other group members.
At the beginning of the experiment you and each other group member will receive a personal endowment of 40 EMUs.
The whole experiment consists of 10 rounds of the following game.
In each round of the game, you have to decide whether to add 0, 2 or 4 EMUs in a public account.
If the public account contains at least 120 EMUs after the 10 th round, each member of your group will keep their savings, i.e. the EMUs of your endowment that were not put in the public account.
However, if this minimum is not reached, the computer will "throw a virtual dice" and each group member will lose his or her remaining EMUs with a 90% chance (9 times out of 10).
Thus, with a 10% chance (1 out of 10) you will keep the remaining EMUs in your private account.
Course of Action
Every round has the same structure and consists of the following steps:
Step 1: Choice of how much to contribute (0,2 or 4).
Step 2: Make a prediction about the amount in the public account.
When the experiment reaches its final round, you will move to the final 3 rd step:
Step 3: Check if the threshold of the public account has been achieved and calculation of final payoffs
Step 1: The contribution choice
In the Step 1, every member will be asked "How many EMUs do you want to contribute to the public account". Three buttons are provided: 0, 2 and 4 EMUs. You can select the amount by clicking the button, as is shown in the figure below:
Image 1: View of Step 1.
On the right side of the screen you can see the time you have left to make your decision and the amount of EMUs in your "Personal Account". You must make your decision within the time displayed on the screen. The "Time left" square will start blinking when you are getting out of time. Nothing happens when the time runs out, yet if you take too long to make a decision the experiment will take too long. Please respond as quickly as possible.
The table "Donations of the previous round" shows the values donated by all the members of your group in the previous round. In the first column, you see your own donation from the previous round. In the other columns, you see the decisions of the other users. The choice of each group member will always be shown in the same column. This information about the previous donations is only available after the first round.
Step 2: Predict the content of the public account After step 1, you will go to a next screen. On this screen, you are asked the following question: "Please, estimate the current total content of the public account". You should enter an estimation of how many EMUs you think the public account contains in total after all members (including you) have made their donations in the current round.
This is an example of what you will see in this step:
Image 2: View of Step 2.
Step 3: Last round and calculation of final payoffs After the last round, you will jump to a final screen.
If the accumulated contributions to the account are equal or higher than 120 EMUs, then you will be informed that you can keep the amount of the endowment that you did not put in the public account. However, if the minimum of 120 EMUs is not reached, the computer will "throw a virtual dice" and all group members will lose all their remaining EMUs with a 90% chance.
There are thus two possible outcomes:
On one hand, with a chance of 9 out of 10, the screen will show: "Your group collected XXX EMUs, which is lower than 120 EMUs. The server has generated a random number between 1 and 100. The resulting value is YYY, which is smaller than 91. This means that you all lose the remaining endowment in your private accounts. Please fill in the amount in
Euro's you see on this screen on the payment document you received before clicking the continue button. This amount is the show-up fee."
On the other hand, with a chance of 1 out of 10, the screen will show: "Your group collected XXX EMUs, which is lower than 120 EMUs. The server has generated a random number between 1 and 100. The resulting value is YYY, which is bigger than 90. This means that you all win the remaining endowment in your private accounts. Please fill in the amount in Euro's you see on this screen on the payment document you received before clicking the continue button. This amount consists of both your private winnings and the show-up fee."
End of experiment questionnaire
At the end of the experiment you will be directed to a form containing a short questionnaire.
Please answer to all the questions honestly, the information you add here is an important part of this experiment. Any information that you may include in this form will remain completely anonymous and cannot be linked to you in any way. Once you have finished filling in the questionnaire, please, click the button submit.
At the end of the experiment, you will be called by one of the organisers to make the payment official. Please stay seated and do not talk until you are called and have left the room.
Please note:
Communication is not allowed during the whole experiment. If you have a question, please raise your hand. decision makers.
The payment is also anonymous, no participant learns from us about the amount that another participant received in the experiment.
Instructions for the low uncertainty treatment (LU)
The instructions of the treatment with low timing uncertainty differ slightly from that of the previous treatment. Below we describe only the sections that change with respect to the control treatment (NU).
Instructions to the experiment
Before starting, you will be randomly assigned into a group. You will never know the identity of the other participants of the group. However, the experiment takes at least 8 rounds and you will be able to observe the actions of the previous round of every member of your group, starting from round 2.
General Information
The whole experiment consists of minimum 8 and on average 10 rounds, but it could be more than that.
The probability that the next round will happen after round 8 is 2/3. This means that at the end of each round, starting from round 8, a "virtual fair dice" with 6 faces, will be thrown. If the result is "1" or "2", the game will end. Otherwise, when the result is "3", "4", "5" or "6", the game will continue to the next round, in which the process is repeated.
If the public account contains at least 120 EMUs after the final round, each member of your group will keep their savings, i.e. the EMUs of your endowment that were not put in the public account.
Course of Action
The end of the experiment is decided by a random process. Starting from round 8 the game will go through a 3 rd step:
Step 3: Check if the experiment should end by throwing a "virtual fair dice".
When the experiment reaches its final round, you will move to the final 4th step:
Step 4: Check if the threshold of the public account has been achieved and calculation of final payoffs
Step 3: Check if the game should end
The probability that the next round will happen after round 8 is 2/3. This means that at the end of each round, starting from round 8, a "virtual fair dice" with 6 faces, will be thrown. If the result is "1" or "2", the game will end. Otherwise, when the result is "3", "4", "5" or "6", the game, will continue to the next round, in which the process is repeated. This means that the experiment will have a minimum of 8 rounds.
There is a "virtual fair dice" for each group. Thus, the experiment can have different rounds, depending on which group you are in.
You will be able to see on the screen the following text if the game continues: "The result of the dice was X, which is different from "1" or "2". Therefore, the experiment will continue to the next round. Please, click now on the button Ok."
However, if the result of the dice is "1" or "2", the screen will show the following text: "The result of the dice was X. Therefore, the experiment will end. Please, click now on the button Ok."
Instructions the high uncertainty treatment (HU)
The instructions for the treatment with high timing uncertainty differ from treatment 2 (low timing uncertainty) only in that the minimum number of rounds is 6 and the probability that the game ends afterwards is 1/5 (or 2/10). However, the average number of rounds remains 10. Below we describe only the sections that differ from the LU treatment:
General Information
The whole experiment consists of minimum 6 and on average 10 rounds, but it could be more than that.
The probability that the next round will happen after round 6 is 8/10. This means that at the end of each round, starting from round 6, a "virtual fair dice" with 10 faces, will be thrown. If the result is "1" or "2", the game will end. Otherwise, when the result is "3", "4", "5", "6", "7", "8", "9" or "10", the game will continue to the next round, in which the process is repeated.
The probability that the next round will happen after round 6 is 8/10. This means that at the end of each round, starting from round 6, a "virtual fair dice" with 10 faces, will be thrown.
If the result is "1" or "2", the game will end. Otherwise, when the result is "3", "4", "5", "6", "7", "8", "9" or "10", the game will continue to the next round, in which the process is repeated. This means that the experiment will have a minimum of 6 rounds.
Testing participant's understanding
After reading the instruction, participants are requested to complete a short questionnaire that tests their understanding. Participants are not allowed to start the experiment until they answer to all questions correctly.
Supplementary experimental results
In Figure 1 of the main text we display the averaged cumulative contributions per group for each of the 3 treatments of our experiment. In Figure S1 we present the average contributions per round. Here we observe that, for the successful groups (met target = True), the investments in the treatments with uncertainty were always higher than in the control treatment (NU) before the minimum number of rounds. The figure also shows that for NU, the difference between successful groups and non-successful ones is mostly related to the contributions in the last two rounds. While the successful groups increase their contributions slightly by the end (compensate for other participants), the non-successful groups lower them.
This highlights the importance of coordination when the time is certain. For the treatments with timing uncertainty this effect disappears, and successful groups contribute more and earlier.
To reveal the differences between the treatments, we used a t-SNE 2D visualization ( Figure   S2 ) of the multidimensional vector that represents each participant (which is represented by a tuple of the actions she took at each round and the total donations of their group mates in the previous round). This representation is able to cluster (with some noise) the participants of each treatment, which allows us to confirm visually that there are differences between them.
Each color in the figure represents one treatment and the colors are the same as those in Figure 1 of the main manuscript (NU black, LU red, HU yellow).
In Figure S3 we show a comparison between the participants behaviors in the first and second parts of the game for the participants that met the target (this corresponds to Figure 2 of the main manuscript) and those that didn't. We can observe an increasing difference between the generous players (those that invest C > F/2) in the first half of the game as timing uncertainty grows. This highlights the importance of early investments to nudge participants into cooperation when there is a shadow on the future. Figure S4 shows the frequency of each of the 3 possible actions, depending on the group investments (without the focal player) in the previous round. This figure combines the participants from both the successful (met the target) and unsuccessful sessions. While in the treatment without timing uncertainty, action 2 is predominant, in the treatment with uncertainty, we observe and increase of the extreme actions (0 and 4). Moreover, action 4 occurs with higher frequency when the previous donations of the other members of the group were higher than 10, and action 0 when they were lower.
We have also extended our analysis of the conditional behavior to study how it depends on time (first half and second half of the game) and on the previous action of the focal player.
Yet, these results must be analyzed with care, since the amount of data used to calculate each point, becomes smaller with each new feature taken into account (which is reflected in the error bars of the figures). Figure S5 indicates that there are differences in conditional behavior depending on the half of the game. This is expected, since Figure 2 of the main text already shows that in the treatments with timing uncertainty, the investments are higher in the first half.
Error! Reference source not found. shows the correlation results and the associated pvalues for the results presented in Figure 3 of the main text. The correlations for the treatment without uncertainty are negative, which indicates a compensatory behavior. For the treatments with uncertainty, however, these correlations are positive, indicating a reciprocal or Tit-for-Tat behavior. Nevertheless, only the correlations for the successful players of LU and HU are statistically significant (P < 0.001).
Dependency analysis
The results in Table S2 -S4 are all obtained using an ordered logistic regression or cumulative link model 1 , implemented in the polr function implemented in the MASS package in R. We estimate the probability of taking an action (0, 2 and 4) depending on a series of features. This allows us to study how the actions of the participants on the experiment depend on these features. We used this analysis to select the most relevant features for the behavioral representation of a participant, which was then used to produce the results of Figure 2 and 3 of the main manuscript. The polr function differs from a multimodal regression in that it performs a ordered logistic regression, i.e., it takes into account the order of the labels. This is important in our case, since the donations 0, 2 or 4 are ordered.
The features included in the regression are:
• public_account: The public account of the game, i.e., the cumulative sum of investments of all participants
• private_account: The private account of the participant, i.e. the remaining endowment at a given round.
• round_donations_others: The donations of the members of the group in the previous round, without the focal player.
• actions_prev: The action of the focal player in the previous round.
• GameHalf2ndHalf: The half of the game in which the action takes place (1 st half, 2 nd half).
producing correct results. The actions of the players should not depend on a random variable.
• public_account:GameHalf2ndHalf: Interaction term between the public account and the game half. Represents the degree to which there is an interaction between these two variables.
• actions_prev:GameHalf2ndHalf: Interaction term between the previous action of the player and the game half.
• private_account:GameHalf2ndHalf: Interaction term between the private account and the game half. Figure S3 . Distribution of players according to their investments. The plots are separated by whether the groups reached (successful) or not (non-successful) the target. The plots show the fraction of players that invested more, equal or less than / , i.e., half of the fair donation, in the first and second half of the game. If every player invested in total . during the game, the group would reach the target with exactly 120 EMUs. For T2 and T3 we consider half of the game to be / . We can observe that the number of participants that invest more than / in the first half of the game (non-procrastinators), increase considerably in the treatments with uncertainty. It is also noticeable that the difference in the fraction of nonprocrastinators between the groups that met and did not meet the target, increases with uncertainty. Table S1 . Correlation between behavior of others and the behavior of a focal player.
This table shows the Pearson correlation coefficients and the associated p-value between the sum of donations of the other members of a group in a previous round and the action of the focal player on the current round. These results are associated with Figure 3 of the main text. The correlation is positive (P < 0.001) for the successful players (target = TRUE) on LU and HU, while the ones that failed to reach the target have a correlation close to 0. The players in NU have a small negative correlation that indicates the presence of compensating behaviors. In Tables S5-S10, we display the results of an ANOVA test that compares polynomial regressions of different order (from 1 to 4) for all the 6 cases analyzed in Figure 3 of the main manuscript. This test indicates whether increasing the order of the polynomial regression issues a significant improvement. In only 3 cases, a polynomial fit is significantly better than the linear model: no uncertainty and players meeting the target; low uncertainty and not meeting the target; and high uncertainty and not meeting the target. In Figure S6 , we show results analogous to Figure 3 of the main manuscript, but using the model that fits the best each case. We show that our conclusions do not change, and perhaps, it is even clearer that, in the certainty case, when players meet the target, they adopt a slightly compensatory behavior, while considerably lowering their contributions when the rest of the group adopt extreme actions: they donate either too much or too little. 
No uncertainty treatment (NU):
Model
Supplementary model results
Here we show additional results of our evolutionary game theoretical model [2] [3] [4] . As fully detailed in the Methods section, we consider five representative strategies encountered in our experiments: always-0 (AL0), always-2 (AL2), always-4 (AL4), compensator (COMP), and reciprocal (RECI). The first three strategies always invest the same: 0, 2, and 4, respectively, independently of the behavior of their opponents.
Compensators only invest when the group members did not invest, and reciprocal players will invest as long as the group members are always investing (see Methods for details). All strategies stop investing once the threshold is reached.
We analyze the behavioral dynamics in large (but finite) populations, when individuals revise their choice through imitation dynamics or social learning [5] [6] [7] . If the mutation probability µ is sufficiently small, the time between two mutation events is so large that, before the next mutation occurs, the population will evolve to a configuration in which all individuals adopt the same strategy. In this case, the dynamics can be approximated by means of a Markov chain whose states correspond to the five homogeneous states of the population (for each of the five strategies (note that 4 is the number of strategies minus one). The normalized left eigenvector associated with eigenvalue 1 of matrix Λ determines the stationary distribution, i.e, the fraction of time the population spends in each of the homogeneous states.
In the limit of neutral selection (β = 0), the fixation probabilities become independent of the fitness values and equal to 1/Z, offering a convenient reference scenario.
Transitions above this threshold are said to be favored by natural selection. In Figure   S6 we show these transitions for two of the most paradigmatic scenarios: NU and HU.
For instance, if an arrow goes from a state with strategy to state with strategy , it indicates that a mutant of strategy will invade the population of strategy with a probability which is higher than the one we obtain from neutral drift. The absence of an arrow indicates that such transition will occur with a low probability, i.e., with a probability lower than 1/Z. In this context, a strategy is said to be evolutionary robust (ERS) 3, 4 if no mutant, adopting any other strategy, has a selective advantage. In other words, we can identify strategies that are evolutionary robust (a measure of stability) by noticing that there is no arrow emerging from its respective node (see Figure S6 ). Figure S6 illustrates a reference scenario in what concerns the invasion dynamics of strategies. In the absence of uncertainty, always-0 and the always-2 strategy are the only two evolutionary robust strategies. Moreover, given the number and strength of the transitions, the fair strategy can easily become the most prevalent behavior.
Differently, under high timing uncertainty, the always-2 strategy starts to be invaded by compensators and always-0 ( Figure S7b ), changing the ecology of behaviors observed in the absence of uncertainty. In fact, uncertainty can easily lead to complex behavioral dynamics, with cyclic dominances, and no evolutionary robust strategies, as illustrated in the right panel of Figure S6 . Reciprocators can invade always-0, yet losing to compensators, which, in turn, are invaded by always-0. From this cyclic dynamic, even if not stable, both conditional strategies emerge as prevailing strategies, leading both to the emergence of reciprocity and polarization (see main text).
The limit of rare mutations allows us to conveniently employ a small-scale Markov chain to analytically compute the prevalence of each strategy. This is achieved by restricting the number of strategies simultaneously co-existing in a population (and groups) to a maximum of two. However, for arbitrary mutation rates, we may have a complex co-existence of more than two strategies, calling for the adoption of largescale computer simulations to confirm the validity of our theoretical results in other mutation (or exploration) regimes. To perform these computer simulations, we mimic the evolutionary process described above, with discrete steps involving imitation and mutation, yet without any constraint in the value of (here a free variable). At the beginning of each simulation, each individual randomly adopts one of the five strategies. In each generation, Z individuals are chosen to revise their strategy (in an asynchronous manner). For each combination of parameters, we run 30 simulations, each lasting 10generations. The fitness of each individual A is calculated as the average return earned from 10 . games played against N-1 individuals randomly selected from the population. The group achievement is computed from the average fraction of groups that surpassed the threshold after a transient period of 10 / generations. The same criterion is used to compute the overall level of polarization emerging from each simulation.
In Figure S8 , we confirm that the stationary distribution obtained under the small mutation limit assumption is valid for a wide range of mutation values. Additionally, we also include the polarization results, considering only group combinations that achieve the target, with and without mutation (see Figure S9) , showing that results discussed in the main text remain valid for a broad interval of exploration rates. always-2 is an evolutionary stable strategy (all arrows point to it, and none goes out).
However, in the high timing uncertainty case (Panel b), it becomes dominated by always-0. Also, reciprocal strategy weakly dominates always-0, resulting in a cyclic dynamic (no strategy dominates). This explain the reduction in always-2 players and the increase of reciprocals. 
